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INTRODUCTION
“[T]he exclusion of Trinity Lutheran from a public benefit for which it is
otherwise qualified, solely because it is a church, is odious to our
Constitution . . . and cannot stand.”1 The Court’s sweeping language in its
recent Trinity Lutheran decision has been called a “new constitutional rule”2
and lauded as a “landmark victory” by proponents of religious liberty. 3 On
the other side of the discussion, constitutional law scholar Erwin
Chemerinsky described the decision as troubling: “a dramatic change in the
law that likely is going to require governments to provide much greater
support for religious institutions than ever before.”4 The decision could also
substantially limit state sovereignty in religious establishment. As Justice
Sotomayor briefly alluded to in her dissent,5 Trinity Lutheran could be the
death knell for antiestablishment clauses on the books in nearly forty states:
“no-aid provisions” that expressly restrict government funding to religious
entities.
In contrast, this paper proposes that state no-aid provisions can in fact be
reconciled with the distinctions in Trinity Lutheran. Lower courts and
legislatures alike should recognize the nuances in these distinctions before
radically extending taxpayer-funded benefits to religious institutions.
This paper proceeds in three parts. First, Part I gives background on the
federal Religion Clauses and no-aid provisions in state constitutions. Next,
Part II details the Trinity Lutheran decision. Finally, Part III first provides a
legal and normative analysis of the Court’s decision, and then discusses the
implications for state no-aid provisions.
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I. BACKGROUND

A. The Federal Religion Clauses
The First Amendment provides that “Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof.”6 The Establishment Clause and Free Exercise Clause subsumed in
this statement collectively comprise the Constitution’s Religion Clauses. The
two Clauses have long been described as being “frequently in tension.”7 For
example, in Everson v. Board of Education, the seminal case incorporating
the Establishment Clause as to the states, the Court stated that, on the one
hand, “[n]o tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied to support any
religious activities or institutions, whatever they may be called, or whatever
form they may adopt to teach or practice religion.”8
However, the Court went on to conclude that, “[o]n the other hand,
other language of the [First A]mendment commands that [a state] cannot
hamper its citizens in the free exercise of their own religion” and thus
“cannot exclude . . . members of any . . . faith, because of their faith, or lack
of it, from receiving the benefits of public welfare legislation.”9 Based on
these principles, the Everson Court held that a state program providing bus
transportation to parochial-school and public-school students alike did not
violate the Establishment Clause. While the Court has tried to ease this
“tension” in later decisions,10 such neutrality towards religion and nonreligion has been one of the consistent principles underpinning the doctrinal
development of the Religion Clauses.11

1. Establishment Clause
Establishment Clause doctrine—particularly in the government benefit
context relevant to Trinity Lutheran’s facts—has undergone substantial
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U.S. CONST. amend. I.
Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 718 (2004) (citing Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 469 (1973)).
Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947).
Id. (emphasis in original); see also Douglas Laycock, Churches, Playgrounds, Government
Dollars—and Schools?, 131 HARV. L. REV. 133, 138 (2017) (discussing how the two principles are
disjointed, but exclusion is not an option).
Id. at 138.
Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 669 (1970) (“The course of constitutional neutrality in this
area cannot be an absolutely straight line; rigidity could well defeat the basic purpose of these
provisions, which is to insure that no religion be sponsored or favored, none commanded, and
none inhibited. The general principle deducible from the First Amendment and all that has been
said by the Court is this: that we will not tolerate either governmentally established religion or
governmental interference with religion. Short of those expressly proscribed governmental acts
there is room for play in the joints productive of a benevolent neutrality which will permit religious
exercise to exist without sponsorship and without interference.”).
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evolution since the Court’s seemingly contradictory language in Everson.12 In
invalidating two separate state programs providing salary and materials
reimbursements to sectarian school teachers, the Court in Lemon v.
Kurtzman articulated a three-part test to determine whether a statute violates
the Establishment Clause: “First, the statute must have a secular legislative
purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither
advances nor inhibits religion; finally, the statute must not foster ‘an excessive
government entanglement with religion.’”13
Under the Lemon test, government funding generally must be restricted
to secular uses to avoid impermissibly advancing religion. For example, in
Tilton v. Richardson, a companion case to Lemon, the Court held that a
federal program providing construction grants directly to colleges and
universities, but expressly limiting the use of funds to facilities that were not
used “for sectarian instruction or religious worship,” was permissible under
the Establishment Clause.14 But the Court severed a provision in the
program that allowed the government’s property interest in the facility to
expire after twenty years because it could have “the effect of advancing
religion” “[i]f, at the end of 20 years, the building is, for example, converted
into a chapel or otherwise used to promote religious interests.”15
Subsequent decisions also considered the religious character of the
recipient, prohibiting “state aid . . . to institutions that are so ‘pervasively
sectarian’ that secular activities cannot be separated from sectarian ones.” 16
Notably, in Aguilar v. Felton and its companion case, School District of
Grand Rapids v. Ball, the Court invalidated state programs that sent publicly
funded teachers into parochial schools to teach classes. 17 Among other
things, the Court reasoned that the pervasively sectarian nature of the schools
could have influenced the publicly funded teachers to religiously indoctrinate
students. Further, the teachers effectively subsidized the religious functions
of the school by reducing its responsibility for teaching secular subjects.18

12

See Laycock, supra note 9, at 137–38.

13

Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612–13 (1971) (citations omitted) (quoting Walz, 397 U.S. at
674).
Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 683–84 (1971).
Id. at 683; see also Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 744 (1973) (upholding state revenue bond
program that financed facilities at religious colleges and universities because, inter alia, the program
excluded worship and religious instruction facilities).
Roemer v. Bd. of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 755, 759 (1976) (finding that universities at issue
were not “pervasively sectarian” and upholding state statute granting annual subsidy to religiously
affiliated private colleges and universities, provided that colleges did not provide only religious
degrees and complied with “statutory prohibition against sectarian use, and . . . administrative
enforcement”).
Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 408–12, (1985), overruled by Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 235
(1997); Sch. Dist. of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 397 (1985), overruled by Agostini, 521
U.S. at 235.
Ball, 473 U.S. at 397; see also Aguilar, 473 U.S. at 412 (“First . . . the aid is provided in a
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However, the Court has increasingly liberalized its approach to
government funding of religious institutions. First, it has recognized a
distinction between benefits provided directly to religious entities and
benefits provided indirectly, or “only as a result of the genuinely
independent and private choices of aid recipients.”19 For example, the
Establishment Clause did not bar a student from using a state-provided
education grant at a religious college in Witters v. Washington Department
of Services for the Blind.20 The fact that the funding was provided directly to
the student, who then independently chose to use the aid to attend a
religious school, “ma[de] the link between the State and the school petitioner
wishe[d] to attend a highly attenuated one.”21 Put another way, there is no
“proximate cause” for an Establishment Clause violation with indirect aid:
the recipient’s independent choice to use such funding at a religious
institution is akin to a superseding act that “breaks the chain of causation”—
here, the connection with state action. 22 However, since the state’s
constitution included a provision precluding any aid to religious entities, the
Court remanded the case back to the state court, noting that “[o]n remand,
the state court is of course free to consider the applicability of the ‘far
stricter’ dictates of the . . . State Constitution.”23
Second, the neutrality of a funding program has become more relevant in
permitting direct aid to flow to religious institutions. Overruling Aguilar and
Ball, the Court in Agostini v. Felton held that state programs sending public
school teachers into religious schools did not violate the Establishment
Clause.24 Noting a “change[ ]” in their “understanding of the criteria used to
assess whether aid to religion has an impermissible effect,”25 the Court
concluded that the programs there would not impermissibly advance
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pervasively sectarian environment. Second, because assistance is provided in the form of teachers,
ongoing inspection is required to ensure the absence of a religious message.”).
Witters v. Wash. Dep’t of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481, 486–87 (1986).
Id. at 489.
Id. at 488; see also Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 653–56, 662–63 (2002) (holding that
a state school voucher program that allowed recipients to use educational grants at private religious
schools did not violate the Establishment Clause because the program was religiously neutral and
one of “true private choice,” where the state provided funds directly to parents who, in turn,
endorsed checks over to schools); Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 398–401 (1983) (holding that a
state statute allowing taxpayers to deduct education expenses incurred in sending their children to
religious schools did not violate the Establishment Clause, as deduction was available to all
taxpayers generally and any aid to religious schools was the result of parents’ independent choices).
See Stuart M. SPEISER ET AL., 3 AMERICAN LAW OF TORTS § 11:9 (Westlaw rev. ed. 2018) (“A
‘superseding cause’ breaks the chain of causation that the defendant began with his or her conduct.
It is a separate act that operates as an independent force to produce the victim’s injury.” (citing State
v. Smith, 819 N.W.2d 724 (Minn. Ct. App. 2012), aff’d, 835 N.W.2d 1 (Minn. 2013)). I am
indebted to Professor Sheldon Nahmod for this proximate cause analogy.
Witters, 474 U.S. at 489 (quoting Witters v. Comm’n for the Blind, 689 P.2d 53, 55 (Wash.
1984)).
Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 234–35 (1997).
Id. at 223.
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religion, nor would pervasive monitoring to ensure secular instruction be
required. Namely, it could not be presumed that the publicly funded
teachers would depart from their secular duties and teach religious doctrine.26
And, importantly, the aid was allocated according to neutral, secular criteria
based on student need regardless of where they attended school, which
reduced the likelihood of the state funding religious indoctrination or a
perceived government endorsement of religion.27
Mitchell v. Helms reaffirmed the Court’s doctrinal shift and cast further
doubt on its prior prohibitions on aid to “pervasively sectarian” institutions,
this time rejecting an as-applied Establishment Clause challenge to an aid
program.28 Here, state and local agencies had received federal funds to
purchase secular educational materials and had in turn loaned those
materials to “pervasively sectarian” Catholic schools in the state.29 Justice
Thomas, writing for the plurality, reasoned that the aid itself was secular and
provided for education, not indoctrination; thus, “the religious nature of a
recipient should not matter to the constitutional analysis, so long as the
recipient adequately furthers the government’s secular purpose.”30 Further,
Thomas extended the “independent and private choices” analysis from
Witters and Agostini. Since the materials were distributed to schools on a
neutral, per-capita enrollment basis, he concluded that this “direct” aid to
religious schools was the result of the private choices of the attending
students.31 Due to these private choices, “any use of that aid to indoctrinate
[could not] be attributed to the government and [was] thus not of
constitutional concern.”32
In her concurrence, Justice O’Connor, joined by Justice Breyer, agreed
that the program’s neutral, secular criteria would not impermissibly advance
religion. However, she rejected the plurality’s analysis that such neutrality
made the program presumptively constitutional, calling it a rule of
“unprecedented breadth.”33 Moreover, she refused to view direct aid made
on a per capita basis the same as indirect aid made as the result of private
choice, reasoning that direct aid to religious institutions increases the
perception of government endorsement of religion. As such, actual
diversion of direct aid to religious uses is still impermissible under the
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Id. at 226–27, 233–34.
Id. at 231–32.
See Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 807–08 (2000) (plurality opinion) (recognizing that Agostini
“recast Lemon’s entanglement inquiry as simply one criterion relevant to determining a statute’s
effect”).
Id. at 801–03.
Id. at 827, 829.
Id. at 829–31.
Id. at 820.
Id. at 837 (O’Connor, J., concurring in judgment).
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Establishment Clause.34

2. Free Exercise Clause
The “tension” between avoiding establishment and protecting the right to
religious conscience also runs through the development of free exercise
doctrine.35 Historically, the Court had strictly scrutinized and almost
invariably invalidated government actions that substantially burdened
religious practice or belief.36 For example, in Sherbert v. Verner, the Court
held that the state’s employment commission violated the petitioner’s free
exercise rights when it disqualified her for unemployment benefits after she
was terminated for refusing to work on her religion’s Sabbath.37 First, here
the petitioner’s religious practice was substantially burdened, as the
commission’s “ruling force[d] her to choose between following the precepts
of her religion and forfeiting benefits, on the one hand, and abandoning one
of the precepts of her religion in order to accept work, on the other hand.”38
The Court then applied strict scrutiny.39 Concluding that the state would
need to show a compelling interest to justify such a burden, the Court found
the state’s interest in reducing fraudulent unemployment claims and
unencumbering employers’ scheduling abilities constitutionally insufficient.40
34
35

36

37
38
39

40

Id. at 840–44.
See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 220–21 (1972) (“The Court must not ignore the danger that
an exception from a general obligation of citizenship on religious grounds may run afoul of the
Establishment Clause, but that danger cannot be allowed to prevent any exception no matter how
vital it may be to the protection of values promoted by the right of free exercise. By preserving
doctrinal flexibility and recognizing the need for a sensible and realistic application of the Religion
Clauses ‘we have been able to chart a course that preserved the autonomy and freedom of religious
bodies while avoiding any semblance of established religion. This is a ‘tight rope’ and one we have
successfully traversed.’” (citation omitted) (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 672
(1970))).
Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 907 (1990) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (“This Court over the
years painstakingly has developed a consistent and exacting standard to test the constitutionality of a
state statute that burdens the free exercise of religion. Such a statute may stand only if the law in
general, and the State’s refusal to allow a religious exemption in particular, are justified by a
compelling interest that cannot be served by less restrictive means.”).
374 U.S. 398, 409–10 (1963).
Id. at 404.
Id. at 406 (“We must next consider whether some compelling state interest enforced in the
eligibility provisions of the South Carolina statute justifies the substantial infringement of appellant’s
First Amendment right.”); see also Yoder, 406 U.S. at 218 (holding that the application of
Wisconsin’s compulsory school attendance law to Amish families who did not send their children
to school after the eighth grade violated their free exercise rights); id. at 215 (“The essence of all
that has been said and written on the subject is that only those interests of the highest order and
those not otherwise served can overbalance legitimate claims to the free exercise of religion.”).
Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 407; see also Hobbie v. Unemp’t Appeals Comm’n, 480 U.S. 136, 139–40
(1987) (holding that state employment commission violated petitioner’s free exercise rights in
denying unemployment benefits where petitioner was terminated for refusing to work on Sabbath);
Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 717–18 (1981) (holding that the state unemployment board
violated claimant’s free exercise rights for refusing unemployment benefits where claimant quit job
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Similarly, significant disqualifications or penalties based on religious
status may constitute substantial burdens. In McDaniel v. Paty, the Court
invalidated a state constitutional provision disqualifying ministers or other
clergy members from serving as delegates to the state constitutional
convention.41 Despite the historical antiestablishment rationales for clergydisqualification in government positions, the Court held that the state
provision violated the petitioner’s free exercise: he could not simultaneously
enjoy his rights to religious practice and to seek and hold office “because the
State has conditioned the exercise of one on the surrender of the other.”42
However, the Court reevaluated its free exercise standards in
Employment Division v. Smith, and held that the government is not required
to provide exemptions for incidental burdens on religious practice due to
compliance with neutral, generally applicable laws.43 Declining to apply
Sherbert’s strict-scrutiny balancing test, the Smith Court concluded that the
state unemployment commission’s denial of unemployment benefits to
claimants who were fired for illegal drug use after taking peyote for religious
reasons did not violate the Free Exercise Clause.44 The Court reasoned that
the law was neutral and generally applicable as it did not attempt to regulate
religious belief and was an “across-the-board criminal prohibition”;45 religious
exemptions from such laws would cause each person “to become a law unto
himself.”46 Accordingly, neutral, generally applicable laws are now typically
only subject to rational basis review.47
In contrast, laws that work to target religious practice or demonstrate
animus or hostility towards religion are subject to strict scrutiny. 48 In Church
of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah , the Court found that,
while a series of municipal ordinances prohibiting animal sacrifice appeared
facially neutral, the ordinances explicitly targeted the Santería religion’s
practices through references to ritual sacrifice, and the actual effect of the
laws was to purposefully discriminate against the church’s religion.49 Taken
together, “almost the only conduct subject to [the ordinances] . . . [was] the
religious exercise of [the] church members.”50

41
42
43
44
45
46
47

48
49
50

after being transferred to the weapons production department because their religious beliefs
forbade production of armaments).
435 U.S. 618, 629 (1978).
Id. at 626.
494 U.S. 872, 878 (1990).
Id. at 882.
Id. at 882, 884.
Id. at 885 (quoting Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 167 (1878)).
See id. at 878–79 (“We have never held that an individual’s religious beliefs excuse him from
compliance with an otherwise valid law prohibiting conduct that the State is free to regulate.”).
Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 546 (1993).
Id. at 535.

Id.

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW ONLINE

8

[Vol. 21:1

Recently, the Court has further clarified that state animus or hostility
towards religion demonstrates a lack of neutrality.51 A Colorado baker
sanctioned for violating the state’s public accommodation law for refusing to
provide a wedding cake for a gay couple due to his religious beliefs recently
prevailed on his free exercise claim in Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v.
Colorado Civil Rights Commission.52 There, the Court found that comments
made by members of the state civil rights commission while adjudicating the
baker’s claim, including describing his refusal as “one of the most despicable
pieces of rhetoric that people can use,” evidenced “clear and impermissible
hostility toward the sincere religious beliefs that motivated his objection.” 53
Further, the commission’s disparate treatment of similar claims also signaled
“disapproval” of the baker’s religious beliefs: the commission had found
lawful other bakers’ refusals to create cakes that disparaged gay marriage.54
In sum, such “hostility was inconsistent with the First Amendment’s
guarantee that our laws be applied in a manner that is neutral toward
religion.”55
But in the government funding context, “there are some state actions
permitted by the Establishment Clause but not required by the Free Exercise
Clause.”56 Accordingly, there is no free exercise violation where the
government does not make funding recipients “choose between their
religious beliefs and receiving a government benefit.”57 In Locke v. Davey,
the Court held that a state scholarship program that prohibited recipients
from pursuing a devotional theology degree did not violate the Free Exercise
Clause.58 First, the Court noted that “the State could, consistent with the
Federal Constitution, permit [scholarship recipients] to pursue a degree in
devotional theology,” but the issue was whether the state’s denial of funds for
that purpose, pursuant to its more restrictive antiestablishment constitutional
provisions, violated the Free Exercise Clause.59
The Court then concluded that, while the program was not facially
neutral towards religion, it did not “suggest[ ] animus towards religion,” as it
allowed students to attend “pervasively religious” institutions as well as enroll
in theology courses.60 Further, qualifying scholarship recipients did not have
to forego the funds, as they remained free to “use their scholarship to pursue
a secular degree at a different institution from where they are studying
51

138 S. Ct. 1719, 1724 (2018).

52

Id.
Id. at 1729.
Id. at 1731.
Id. at 1732.

53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 719 (2004).
Id. at 720–21.
Id. at 715.
Id. at 719.
Id. at 720, 724–25.
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devotional theology.”61 In short, “[t]he State ha[d] merely chosen not to fund
a distinct category of instruction.”62

B. State “No-Aid Provisions”
As seen above in Witters and Locke, state constitutions often contain
establishment clause provisions that are more restrictive than the federal
counterpart. In fact, only about ten states have establishment clause
provisions with language that parallels the federal Establishment Clause.63
The remainder typically have language that restricts state aid to religious
entities to varying degrees. For the purposes of this paper, such provisions
will collectively be referred to as “no-aid provisions.” The two most relevant
provisions are state “Blaine Amendments” and “compelled support
provisions.”64

1. Blaine Amendments
State Blaine Amendments are “named” after the failed federal
amendment proposed by House Representative James G. Blaine in 1876.65
Various commentators have noted that the federal Blaine Amendment arose
out of distinct anti-Catholic animus, after Catholic immigrants had
increasingly obtained government support and funding for sectarian schools
in the mid-nineteenth century.66 Accordingly, Blaine’s proposed amendment
specifically sought to curtail sectarian influence in education funding, stating:
[N]o money raised by taxation in any State for the support of public schools,
or derived from any public fund therefor, nor any public lands devoted
thereto, shall ever be under the control of any religious sect; nor shall any
money so raised or lands so devoted be divided between religious sects or

61
62
63

64

65
66

Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 721 n.4 (2004).
Id. at 721.
James N.G. Cauthen, Referenda, Initiatives, and State Constitutional No-Aid Clauses, 76 ALB. L.
REV. 2141, 2145 & n.21 (2013).
Jill Goldenziel, Blaine’s Name in Vain?: State Constitutions, School Choice, and Charitable
Choice, 83 DENV. U. L. REV. 57, 63 (2005); see also Luke A. Lantta, The Post-Zelman Voucher
Battleground: Where to Turn After Federal Challenges to Blaine Amendments Fail , 67 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 213, 214, 229 (2004).
Goldenziel, supra note 64, at 63.
Id.; see also Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 828 (2000) (plurality opinion) (“Opposition to aid to
‘sectarian’ schools acquired prominence in the 1870’s with Congress’ consideration (and near
passage) of the Blaine Amendment, which would have amended the Constitution to bar any aid to
sectarian institutions. Consideration of the amendment arose at a time of pervasive hostility to the
Catholic Church and to Catholics in general, and it was an open secret that ‘sectarian’ was code for
‘Catholic.’”); Cauthen, supra note 63, at 2147; Kyle Duncan, Secularism’s Laws: State Blaine
Amendments and Religious Persecution , 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 493, 495 (2003); Mark Edward
DeForrest, An Overview and Evaluation of State Blaine Amendments: Origins, Scope, and First
Amendment Concerns, 26 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 551, 558–65 (2003); Lantta, supra note 64, at
215–18.
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denominations.67

However, despite the anti-Catholic narrative associated with the Blaine
Amendment, some scholars dispute the degree to which such animus
existed, as well as the influence of the federal amendment on similar state
provisions. At least fifteen states had enacted restrictions on funding to
parochial schools prior to the debates surrounding the Blaine Amendment.68
Further, several of these states were largely devoid of “significant conflicts
over parochial school funding at the time.”69 However, over twenty states
enacted Blaine Amendments in the period following the federal
constitutional debate and in the early twentieth century. 70
Contemporary definitions of state Blaine Amendments vary. 71 Some
commentators use the term to describe constitutional provisions that, like the
original Blaine Amendment, only expressly prohibit government funding to
religious schools.72 Others include provisions that preclude funding to
religious entities generally.73 Regardless of the particulars, at least thirty-eight
states have constitutional provisions that restrict government aid to religious
entities at least to some degree.74
State Blaine Amendments also vary considerably in their application,
ranging from restrictive to permissive. Restrictive amendments, like
Michigan’s express prohibition on school vouchers,75 often prohibit indirect
(e.g., “independent choice” aid) in addition to direct government aid, while
permissive provisions are generally limited to direct aid and are also

67
68
69

70

71
72
73

74

75

Goldenziel, supra note 64, at 64.
Cauthen, supra note 63, at 2147.
Steven K. Green, The Insignificance of the Blaine Amendment, 2008 BYU L. REV. 295, 313
(“The Michigan Constitution served as an example for similar no-funding constitutional provisions
in Wisconsin (1848), Indiana (1851), Ohio (1851), and Minnesota (1857).”). But see Laycock,
supra note 9, at 166–67 (“If a state’s Blaine provision results in facial discrimination between
religious and secular private education, then motive should not matter after Trinity Lutheran. Such
‘express discrimination’ is unconstitutional without regard to motive. This may reduce the stakes of
the debate over motive.”).
Green, supra note 69, at 327 (“[T]wenty-one states adopted their provisions between 1876—the year
of the debate over the Blaine Amendment—and 1911—the year marking the admission of New
Mexico, the last state admitted before a fifty-year hiatus broken by Alaska and Hawaii.”).
Goldenziel, supra note 64, at 68 (“Scholars disagree over the definition of a Blaine Amendment.”).
Lantta, supra note 64, at 226–27.
Duncan, supra note 66, at 515 (“For my purposes, a State Blaine means a state constitutional
provision that bars persons’ and organizations’ access to public benefits explicitly because they are
religious persons or organizations. This is a broad definition . . . . For instance, some bar equal
participation in public aid only to religious schools; others bar religious organizations or institutions;
yet others bar non-public institutions generally, while explicitly including religious institutions in that
category.”).
See Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012, 2037 & n.10 (2017)
(Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (noting that “[t]oday, thirty-eight States have a counterpart to Missouri’s
[no-aid provision]” and listing no-aid provisions); Green, supra note 69, at 327.
MICH. CONST. art. VIII, § 2; see also Goldenziel, supra note 64, at 82.
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supported by lenient judicial interpretations.76 For example, New York’s noaid provision is actually titled the “Blaine Amendment.” But despite this
ominous moniker, New York courts have interpreted the provision’s facially
restrictive prohibition on “indirect” aid to mean indirectly establishing or
advancing religion.77 However, roughly seventeen states’ no-aid provisions
fall into the restrictive or strict category. 78

2. Compelled Support Clauses
Compelled support clauses have similarly been construed to restrict
government aid to religious entities. Such provisions are found in twentynine state constitutions and generally preclude taxpayers from being forced
to financially support religious institutions.79 “[S]tate courts generally have
not interpreted compelled support clauses to place any greater restrictions
on government than those imposed under the First Amendment,” 80 but
Vermont in particular has used a compelled support provision to prohibit a
school choice program.81 Further, no-funding provisions are also found
within or following compelled support clauses and have been interpreted
together with them. 82
II. TRINITY LUTHERAN
Trinity Lutheran Church operates a Child Learning Center, which
provides daycare and preschool services on a nondiscriminatory basis to the
Boone County, Missouri community at large. 83 The Church expressly
includes the Learning Center as one of its religious ministries, and includes
“developmentally appropriate” religious instruction in its programs. 84 The
Learning Center also has a well-equipped playground, albeit with an
“unforgiving” pea gravel surface, used by both Center students and other
76

77
78
79
80
81

82

83
84

Lantta, supra note 64, at 226–27; see also Frank R. Kemerer, The Constitutional Dimension of
School Vouchers, 3 TEX. F. ON C.L. & C.R. 137, 172 (1998).
Lantta, supra note 64, at 240.
Id. at 227.
Cauthen, supra note 63, at 2145; Goldenziel, supra note 64, at 64–65.
Cauthen, supra note 63, at 2145.
Chittenden Town Sch. Dist. v. Dep’t of Educ., 738 A.2d 539, 562–63 (Vt. 1999); see also
Goldenziel, supra note 64, at 65.
See MICH. CONST. art. I, § 4 (“No person shall be compelled to attend, or, against his consent, to
contribute to the erection or support of any place of religious worship, or to pay tithes, taxes or
other rates for the support of any minister of the gospel or teacher of religion. No money shall be
appropriated or drawn from the treasury for the benefit of any religious sect or society, theological
or religious seminary; nor shall property belonging to the state be appropriated for any such
purpose.”); Am. Atheists, Inc. v. City of Detroit Downtown Dev. Auth., 567 F.3d 278, 301 (6th Cir.
2009).
Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012, 2017 (2017).
Id. at 2027–28 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
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children in the local community.85
The Missouri Department of Natural Resources ran a Scrap Tire
Program providing reimbursement grants on a competitive basis to qualifying
organizations that installed rubber surfaces made from recycled tires. 86 The
Learning Center applied for a grant under the program in 2012, seeking to
resurface its playground and ameliorate the safety hazards posed by the
existing pea gravel.87 Despite being one of the most competitive candidates,88
the Department denied the Center’s application under its policy that
categorically excluded “any applicant owned or controlled by a church, sect,
or other religious entity,”89 adopted pursuant to the Missouri constitution’s
no-aid provision.90
The Church subsequently sued the Department in federal court,
asserting that the Department’s denial of its grant application violated the
First Amendment’s Free Exercise, Establishment, and Free Speech Clauses,
the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause, and the state
constitution’s no-aid provision.91
Recognizing the more stringent separation of church and state under the
Missouri Constitution and distinguishing cases where aid was provided to
institutions that were religiously affiliated but ultimately not controlled by
religious entities, the district court first determined that awarding a grant to
the Church would violate the state constitution’s no-aid provision.92
The court then held that the Department’s denial did not violate the Free
Exercise Clause. Primarily relying on Locke, the court found that the
Department had merely excluded the Church from receiving an affirmative
benefit and as such did not target religious practice. Further, the
government’s significant antiestablishment interest outweighed the relatively
minor burden on the Church.93 Moreover, the court concluded that since
the Department, consistent with the Establishment Clause, could provide
grants to the Church, a possible Establishment Clause violation was “not at
85
86
87
88
89
90

91

92
93

Id. at 2017–18 (majority opinion).
Id. at 2017.
Id.
Id. at 2018 (“The Center ranked fifth among the 44 applicants in the 2012 Scrap Tire Program.”).
Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012, 2017 (2017).
See MO. CONST. art. I, § 7 (“[N]o money shall ever be taken from the public treasury, directly or
indirectly, in aid of any church, sect or denomination of religion, or in aid of any priest, preacher,
minister or teacher thereof, as such; and that no preference shall be given to nor any discrimination
made against any church, sect or creed of religion, or any form of religious faith or worship.”).
Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Pauley, 976 F. Supp. 2d 1137, 1140 (W.D. Mo.
2013), aff’d, 788 F.3d 779 (8th Cir. 2015), rev’d and remanded sub nom. Trinity Lutheran, 137 S.
Ct. 2012. As the Supreme Court did not reach the merits of the Church’s Equal Protection or Free
Speech claims, the lower court’s reasoning as to those claims is omitted from this background
discussion.
Id. at 1141–45.
Id. at 1146–51.
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issue in this case.”94
On appeal, the Eighth Circuit similarly rejected the Church’s federal and
state constitutional claims and affirmed the judgment. 95 The court again
recognized that “Missouri could include the Learning Center’s playground in
a non-discriminatory Scrap Tire grant program without violating the
Establishment Clause,” but that the issue was “whether the Free Exercise
Clause [or] the Establishment Clause . . . compel Missouri to provide public
grant money directly to a church, contravening a long-standing state
constitutional provision that is not unique to Missouri.”96 Finding that “[n]o
Supreme Court case . . . has granted such relief,” the court noted that “only
the Supreme Court [could] make that leap,” again relying on Locke to hold
that the state no-aid provision did not conflict with the federal Religion
Clauses.97
The Supreme Court, in a 7–2 decision, reversed. Consistent with the
lower court decisions, the Court first conceded that “[t]he parties agree that
the Establishment Clause of th[e First] Amendment does not prevent
Missouri from including Trinity Lutheran in the Scrap Tire Program.”98
Proceeding to the Church’s free exercise claim, Chief Justice Roberts, writing
for the majority, noted that “[t]he Free Exercise Clause ‘protect[s] religious
observers against unequal treatment’ and subjects to the strictest scrutiny laws
that target the religious for ‘special disabilities’ based on their ‘religious
status.’”99
Analogizing to McDaniel and Sherbert, the majority found that the
Department’s categorical exclusion of the Center from the grant program
effectively imposed a penalty on the Church and other religious entities
“solely because of their religious character.”100 Roberts then distinguished
Locke by indicating that Washington state had “merely chosen not to fund a
distinct category of instruction” and that the claimant there “was not denied a
scholarship because of who he was; he was denied a scholarship because of
what he proposed to do—use the funds to prepare for the ministry.”101 In
contrast, here, the Church “was denied a grant simply because of what it is—a
church.”102
Further, the Department’s antiestablishment interest was not analogous
to the state of Washington’s in Locke since clergy training was an “essentially
94

Id. at 1151.

95

Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Pauley, 788 F.3d 779, 790 (8th Cir. 2015).
Id. at 784.
Id. at 784–85.
Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012, 2019 (2017).
Id. at 2019 (quoting Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 533, 542 (1993)
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
Id. at 2021–22.
Id. at 2023 (internal citations omitted).

96
97
98
99

100
101
102

Id.
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religious endeavor” and clearly distinct from playground resurfacing in this
case.103
In addition, the Locke Court only reached the state’s
antiestablishment interest after determining that the state program there “did
not require students to choose between their religious beliefs and receiving a
government benefit.”104 Here, the majority found that the Church essentially
had to choose between the two.105 Since the Department’s antiestablishment
interest was not “compelling,” the Court found that its policy violated the
Church’s free exercise rights, emphatically stating that “the exclusion of
Trinity Lutheran from a public benefit for which it is otherwise qualified,
solely because it is a church, is odious to our Constitution all the same, and
cannot stand.”106 However, Roberts, joined by a plurality of Justices,
attempted to limit the reach of the decision in footnote three to the majority
opinion: “This case involves express discrimination based on religious
identity with respect to playground resurfacing. We do not address religious
uses of funding or other forms of discrimination.”107
Justices Gorsuch and Thomas each concurred in part but declined to
join footnote three. Thomas expressed concern with “[t]his Court’s
endorsement in Locke of even a ‘mil[d] kind’ of discrimination against
religion,” but agreed with the majority’s narrow interpretation of the case.108
Gorsuch questioned the majority’s distinction from Locke between
“discriminat[ion] on the basis of religious status and religious use,”
specifically noting that, it shouldn’t “matter whether we describe [a] benefit,
say, as closed to Lutherans (status) or closed to people who do Lutheran
things (use). It is free exercise either way.”109 Accordingly, free exercise
principles “do not permit discrimination against religious exercise—whether
on the playground or anywhere else.”110
Justice Breyer concurred in the judgment, specifically reasoning that the
Scrap Tire Program—due to its focus on child health and safety—was more
properly characterized not as a mere public benefit, but more akin to public
welfare.111 In that sense, precluding the Church from the program would be
analogous to cutting it off from such “general government services as
103

Id.

104

Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012, 2023 (2017) (internal
quotations omitted).
Id. at 2024 (“In this case, there is no dispute that Trinity Lutheran is put to the choice between
being a church and receiving a government benefit.”).
Id. at 2025.
Id. at 2024 n.3 (plurality). Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion was joined in full by Justices Kennedy,
Alito, and Kagan. Justices Thomas and Gorsuch joined except as to footnote three, and Justice
Breyer concurred in the judgment only. Justices Sotomayor and Ginsburg dissented. Id. at 2016
(majority opinion).
Id. at 2025 (Thomas, J., concurring) (second alteration in original) (internal citations omitted).
Id. at 2025–26 (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (emphasis in original).
Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012, 2026 (2017).
Id. at 2026–27 (Breyer, J., concurring in judgment).
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ordinary police and fire protection” that the Everson Court stated churches
and religious institutions were clearly entitled to receive.112
In an impassioned dissent, Justice Sotomayor, joined by Justice Ginsberg,
first argued that, contrary to the assertions of the parties, providing direct
funding to the Church would violate the Establishment Clause.113 Noting the
inherently religious mission of the Learning Center, Sotomayor found that
direct program grants would impermissibly advance religion, as “[t]he
playground surface cannot be confined to secular use any more than lumber
used to frame the Church’s walls, glass stained and used to form its windows,
or nails used to build its altar.”114
Even absent an Establishment Clause violation, Justice Sotomayor
concluded that the interplay between the Religion Clauses often requires the
government to “draw lines based on an entity’s religious ‘status.’”115 After
providing a substantive historical discussion of state opposition to public
funding of religious entities, she argued that the Locke decision recognized
this historic state interest.116
Further, Justice Sotomayor contended that since the Establishment
Clause prohibits government from funding religious activities, “[a] state can
reasonably use status as a ‘house of worship’ as a stand-in for ‘religious
activities.’”117 Also noting that “thirty-eight states have a counterpart to
Missouri’s [no-aid provision],”118 she concluded by expressing concern that
the majority’s decision “holds not just that a government may support houses
of worship with taxpayer funds, but that—at least in this case and perhaps in
others—it must do so whenever it decides to create a funding program.”119
III. DISCUSSION

A. Legal Perspectives on Trinity Lutheran
At first, what may be most striking about the decision is the complete
absence of analysis on the Establishment Clause issue. Chief Justice
Roberts’ omission is no doubt a flaw in the majority opinion. However, it is
ultimately a minor one. Despite Justice Sotomayor’s vigorous argument,
including Trinity Lutheran in the Scrap Tire Program likely does not violate
112
113

114
115
116
117
118
119

Id. at 2027 (quoting Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1947)).
Id. at 2028–29 (2017) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“The government may not directly fund religious
exercise. . . . Nowhere is this rule more clearly implicated than when funds flow directly from the
public treasury to a house of worship.”).
Id. at 2030.
Id. at 2031.
Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012, 2036 (2017).

Id.
Id. at 2037.
Id. at 2041 (internal citation omitted).
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the Establishment Clause. Sotomayor is entirely correct in recognizing that
“[c]onstitutional questions are decided by this Court, not the parties’
concessions.”120 But, her Establishment Clause analysis effectively ignores the
Court’s recent shift away from categorical prohibitions on aid to “pervasively
sectarian” institutions.121 Resurfacing a gravel playground at a church daycare
cannot reasonably be interpreted as advancing or endorsing religious
indoctrination any more than placing public school teachers in pervasively
sectarian schools could in the program upheld in Agostini.122 In prior cases,
the Court has noted “‘special Establishment Clause dangers,’ when money is
given to religious schools or entities directly,” 123 and Justice Sotomayor
emphasized that Trinity Lutheran had provided no “assurances that public
funds would not be used for religious activity.” 124 However, since the Scrap
Tire Program only provides one-time reimbursement grants for playground
resurfacing costs, the state can easily verify and ensure secular use of the
funds.125
The majority opinion’s free exercise analysis, in contrast, fails in several
respects. Despite Chief Justice Roberts’ attempt to limit the reach of the
decision, footnote three is unlikely to have that practical effect. The footnote
only garnered a plurality of Justices, leaving courts and future litigants to
likely rely on the opinion’s sweeping pronouncements.126
More importantly, Roberts’ interpretation of free exercise precedent
does not support his opinion’s far-reaching “nondiscrimination” principle.127
He and the majority ultimately rejected the government’s antiestablishment
interest as not compelling enough in concluding that the Department’s
exclusion of religious entities from the Scrap Tire Program constituted

120

Id. at 2028.

121

Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 826–28 (2000) (plurality opinion).
Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 228, 234–35 (1997).
Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 818–19 (internal citation omitted) (quoting Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors
of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 842 (1995)).
Trinity Lutheran, 137 S. Ct. at 2029.
Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 688 (1971) (noting that the construction grants for secular
facilities at religious colleges at issue were a one-time payment and thus “no government analysis of
an institution’s expenditures on secular as distinguished from religious activities” would be
required).
Aside from only commanding a plurality, the footnote may have been a mere compromise to
secure the majority’s result, and, in particular, Justice Breyer’s vote. Gillian E. Metzger, Foreword,
1930s Redux: The Administrative State Under Siege, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1, 29 (2017). However,
despite their separate opinions, it is not unreasonable to speculate that Justices Breyer, Sotomayor,
and Ginsburg would likely agree with footnote 3’s limiting principle, which may lend more support
for its future importance. Frank Ravitch, Symposium: Trinity Lutheran and Zelman—Saved by
Footnote 3 or a Dream Come True for Voucher Advocates? , SCOTUSBLOG (June 26, 2017,
10:59
PM),
http://www.scotusblog.com/2017/06/symposium-trinity-lutheran-church-v-comerzelman-v-simmons-harris-saved-footnote-3-dream-come-true-voucher-advocates/.
Edward Correia, Trinity Lutheran Church v. Comer: An Unfortunate New Anti-Discrimination
Principle, 18 RUTGERS J.L. & RELIGION 280, 290–92 (2017).
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“discrimination” on the basis of religious status. However, the compelling
government interest requirement under Sherbert and McDaniel—the free
exercise government aid cases most analogous to the facts in Trinity
Lutheran—was effectively abrogated by Smith as to neutral and generally
applicable government action.128
The majority opinion did note that the program was generally applicable,
but maintained it was not neutral as it expressly referenced religion.129 But,
under Locke, which Roberts fervently distinguished but ultimately upheld, a
policy’s lack of facial neutrality as to religion does not automatically trigger
strict scrutiny review.130
Instead, Locke clarifies Lukumi’s neutrality
requirement in the context of government aid to religious organizations: a
program is not neutral if it demonstrates “animus” or “hostility” towards
religion.131 The animus in Lukumi was clear: the city government specifically
targeted the Santería religion because it disapproved of its religious practices.
Likewise, the state commission in Masterpiece Cakeshop was similarly
hostile and disapproving of the baker’s religious views on gay marriage in his
decision to refuse service at his business.132 Missouri’s desire to avoid
violating the Constitution is not nearly of the same ilk.
Accordingly, “discrimination” on the basis of religious status that triggers
strict scrutiny review should be accompanied by demonstrable animus or
hostility towards religion. Although the case was decided after Trinity
Lutheran, the Masterpiece Cakeshop decision supports the principle that
such hostility should reflect palpable state disapproval of religious belief.133
Unfortunately, the Court has increasingly considered a mere lack of
neutrality between secular and religious institutions in the provision of
128

129
130

131

132
133

See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 513 (1997) (“In evaluating the claim [in Smith], we
declined to apply the balancing test set forth in Sherbert v. Verner, under which we would have
asked whether Oregon’s prohibition substantially burdened a religious practice and, if it did,
whether the burden was justified by a compelling government interest.” (internal citation omitted));
Ruiz-Diaz v. United States, 703 F.3d 483, 486 (9th Cir. 2012) (“The Supreme Court in
Employment Division v. Smith overruled Sherbert and [Wisconsin v.] Yoder.” (internal citations
omitted)); see Correia, supra note 127, at 292 (arguing that McDaniel is the case “closest to the
broad proposition the Court claims,” but “the Court’s authority for the ‘highest order’ test [in
McDaniel] comes from a case that has been clearly rejected if not overruled outright”).
Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012, 2024 (2017).
Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 720 (2004) (“[Petitioner] contends that under the rule we
enunciated in Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah , the program is presumptively
unconstitutional because it is not facially neutral with respect to religion. We reject his claim of
presumptive unconstitutionality, however; to do otherwise would extend the Lukumi line of cases
well beyond not only their facts but their reasoning.” (internal citation and footnote omitted)).
See id. at 725 (“[W]e find neither in the history or text of [the state no-aid provision], nor in the
operation of the Promise Scholarship Program, anything that suggests animus toward religion.”);
Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 533 (1993) (“[I]f the
object of a law is to infringe upon or restrict practices because of their religious motivation, the law
is not neutral.”).
Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1729–30, 1732 (2018).
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government benefits as demonstrating “hostility” towards religion,134 despite
rational justifications for the exclusion of religious entities from government
aid programs. This understanding of discrimination oversimplifies Lukumi’s
formulation, where for discrimination to be constitutionally suspect, it must
be rooted in the “targeting,” “suppression,”135 or “disfavor of religion.”136 The
Court has repeatedly recognized that government distinctions based on
religious status are often necessary because of the interactions between the
Religion Clauses.137

B. Normative Perspectives on Trinity Lutheran
From a normative perspective, the result in Trinity Lutheran is probably
the “right” one. After all, this is also a case about “scraped knees” on
neighborhood playgrounds.138 The Learning Center was likely the most
deserving grant recipient in Boone County, Missouri. It ranked fifth out of
all applicants. Its playground was public and not only served its
approximately ninety students, but also children from the entire
community.139 The program’s goals of increasing child safety on playgrounds
while reducing scrap tire waste in landfills would not be as adequately
fulfilled if the Missouri Department of Resources didn’t replace the Learning
Center’s “unforgiving” pea gravel playground surface.140

134

135
136

137

138
139

140

See Trinity Lutheran, 137 S. Ct. at 2025 (“[T]he exclusion of Trinity Lutheran from a public
benefit for which it is otherwise qualified, solely because it is a church, is odious to our Constitution
all the same, and cannot stand.” (emphasis added)); Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 828 (2000)
(plurality opinion) (“[H]ostility to aid to pervasively sectarian schools has a shameful pedigree that
we do not hesitate to disavow.”); Frank S. Ravitch, The Supreme Court’s Rhetorical Hostility:
What Is “Hostile” to Religion Under the Establishment Clause? , 2004 BYU L. REV. 1031, 1034
(“[T]he Court (or a plurality of Justices) has in essence said that failure to treat religious entities and
individuals like all other entities and individuals is hostile toward religion. Thus, the Court seems
poised to treat hostility and lack of formal neutrality as two sides of the same coin.” (footnote
omitted)).
Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 533.
Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 720 (2004) (“In the present case, the State’s disfavor of religion (if it
can be called that) is of a far milder kind. It imposes neither criminal nor civil sanctions on any
type of religious service or rite. It does not deny to ministers the right to participate in the political
affairs of the community.”).
See Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012, 2040 (2017)
(Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“A State’s decision not to fund houses of worship does not disfavor
religion; rather, it represents a valid choice to remain secular in the face of serious establishment
and free exercise concerns. That does not make the State ‘atheistic or antireligious.’” (quoting
County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 610 (1989)); Correia, supra note 127, at 294 (“There
will always be an element of ‘discrimination’ in the treatment of religious and non-religious activities
and organizations as long as the Establishment Clause has any meaning.”).
Trinity Lutheran, 137 S. Ct. at 2025 (majority opinion).
Steven D. Schwinn, Can a State Exclude a Church from an Otherwise Neutral and Secular Grant
Program Just Because It Is a Church?: Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia v. Comer (Docket
No. 15-577), 44 PREVIEW U.S. SUP. CT. CAS. 214, 214 (2017).
Trinity Lutheran, 137 S. Ct. at 2017.
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But the boundless principles on religious “discrimination” the majority
opinion invokes to resolve the issue are deeply troubling. The majority’s
adherence to an austere, formalistic conception of neutrality and
nondiscrimination in government funding fails to account for the unique
status that houses of worship occupy in our legal and social framework. The
Free Exercise Clause requires a certain degree of government
noninterference in church affairs: a “special solitude” that is distinct and
exceeds similar “secular” constitutional protections, such as the freedom of
association.141 As such, the government cannot, among other things, judicially
resolve certain church property disputes or require houses of worship to
comply with employment discrimination statutes in the selection of clergy. 142
Until Trinity Lutheran of course, accommodations affirmatively required
by the Free Exercise Clause were few. Instead, where there is no
Establishment Clause violation, federal and state governments have extended
substantial accommodations to religious entities as a matter of legislative
grace rooted in the noninterference principle. 143
Such discretionary
accommodations can properly be considered “benefits.”144 Many of these
accommodations are not granted to similar, secular organizations. For
instance, houses of worship may discriminate on the basis of religion in all
employment decisions145 and enjoy additional federal tax exemptions over
secular nonprofits.146 And here, these discretionary benefits only need to be
141
142

143

144

145

146

Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171, 189 (2012).
Id. at 188–90; Presbyterian Church in the United States v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem’l
Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 449 (1969) (“[T]he First Amendment severely circumscribes
the role that civil courts may play in resolving church property disputes.”).
Real Alternatives, Inc. v. Sec’y Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 867 F.3d 338, 352 (3d Cir. 2017)
(citing Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 720–22 (2005)).
Kevin L. Brady, Comment, Religious Sincerity and Imperfection: Can Lapsing Prisoners Recover
Under RFRA and RLUIPA?, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 1431, 1455 (2011) (“Religious accommodations
often provide benefits solely to sincere adherents.”).
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1 (2012); Corp. of Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day
Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 338 (1987) (“Where . . . government acts with the proper purpose of
lifting a regulation that burdens the exercise of religion, we see no reason to require that the
exemption come packaged with benefits to secular entities.”).
Religious entities and secular nonprofits are both eligible for federal tax exemption. See 26 U.S.C.
§ 501(c)(3) (2012) (authorizing non-profit exemption from federal taxes). However, houses of
worship (and in some cases their auxiliary organizations) do not have to apply for recognition of the
exemption or file an annual information return (returns are open to public inspection). See id.
§ 508(c)(1) (showing that houses of worship are exempt from the need to file a 501(c)(3)); id.
§ 6033(a)–(b) (exempting religious organizations from annual information returns). Nor are they
presumed to be private foundations, exempting them from additional regulations and special taxes.
See id. § 508(b), (c)(1)(A) (outlining the special existence of religious entities as exempt from
private foundation taxes). They are generally not subject to audit, and do not have to pay
employment taxes or comply with certain retirement plan requirements for their ministers. See id.
§ 7611(a)(1), (2) (exempting religious entities from audit); id. § 3309(b)(1)–(2), 414(e) (showing that
religious entities as employers are exempt from employment taxes and retirement plan
requirements); see also W. COLE DURHAM AND ROBERT SMITH, 4 RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS
AND THE LAW § 32:6 (Westlaw rev. ed. 2017) (summarizing the tax exemptions that religious
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distributed neutrally among religions to comport with the Establishment and
Equal Protection Clauses, despite the lack of neutrality between religious and
secular entities.147
Accordingly, the Trinity Lutheran decision essentially allows houses of
worship and religious organizations to “double-dip” in benefits and
accommodations.148 It allows state governments to extend discretionary
benefits solely to religious entities under a less stringent concept of neutrality
while simultaneously requiring state governments to include them in
discretionary funding programs extended to secular entities under a higher
neutrality standard. This inconsistency undermines neutrality overall by
prioritizing religious “status,” cripples the “play in the joints” in the Religion
Clauses where the legislature may allocate assistance according to political
preferences, and appears fundamentally at odds with common-sense notions
of fairness.
Moreover, the majority’s conclusion that arguably benign exclusions of
religious entities from government funding programs constitute “odious”
status discrimination may raise equal protection concerns where the
government seeks to accommodate religion. For example, state action based
on racial status is subject to strict scrutiny review regardless of whether it
burdens or benefits individuals in the class.149 In contrast, religious
accommodations are typically only subject to a far less rigorous
Establishment Clause analysis.150 If, according to the Trinity Lutheran
majority, strict scrutiny applies whenever government restricts religious
participation in government funding programs, strict scrutiny should likewise
apply when the government extends discretionary benefits exclusively to
religious entities. A heightened standard of review may threaten a host of

147

148

149

150

entities enjoy). Additionally, ministers themselves receive various exemptions under the tax code.
See id. § 107 (outlining the ministerial exemptions in the tax code).
Amos, 483 U.S. at 338–39 (“Appellees argue that [the religious discrimination exemption under
Title VII] offends equal protection principles by giving less protection to the employees of religious
employers than to the employees of secular employers. . . . But . . . laws discriminating among
religions are subject to strict scrutiny, and . . . laws ‘affording a uniform benefit to all religions’
should be analyzed under Lemon.” (internal citations omitted)).
See Ira C. Lupu, Government Messages and Government Money: Santa Fe, Mitchell v. Helms,
and the Arc of the Establishment Clause, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 771, 820 (2001) (“[T]he
absence of a religious nondiscrimination requirement in hiring might be seen as double-dipping by
religious institutions, which rely on their sectarian character in their quest for autonomy in selecting
employees while simultaneously seeking a place as a religion-neutral dispenser of government
benefits.”); Laura B. Mutterperl, Note, Employment at (God’s) Will: The Constitutionality of
Antidiscrimination Exemptions in Charitable Choice Legislation, 37 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 389,
432–33 (2002).
See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 223–24 (1995) (under “consistency”
principle, holding that all race-based classifications are subject to strict scrutiny regardless of “the
race of those burdened or benefited by a particular classification” (quoting City of Richmond v. J.A.
Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 494 (1989))).
Amos, 483 U.S. at 338–39.
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permissible religious accommodations.
For instance, historical
noninterference in church affairs may be a compelling government interest
in upholding exemptions from federal tax audits and reporting requirements
for houses of worship,151 but the breadth of the exemption is likely not
narrowly tailored. There are likely less restrictive means to avoid substantial
interference in religious affairs while still subjecting churches to similar tax
requirements as secular nonprofits. For one, church financial records could
be reviewed as a matter of course “to the extent necessary to determine the
liability for, and the amount of, any tax”—the Internal Revenue Service is
already authorized to do when it reasonably believes a church claiming an
exemption is not a bona fide church.152
In either event, the Trinity Lutheran decision may be a double-edged
sword. On the one hand, religious entities may now be able to participate in
a wide swath of government funding programs previously foreclosed to them.
On the other hand, government funding is a finite resource, and increased
program participation likewise increases the strain on those resources.
Constitutionally mandated inclusion of religious entities may thus have a
chilling effect on social welfare programs. Legislatures may reduce the
amount of benefits under existing funding programs and decline to offer new
ones due to budget constraints. The force of Chief Justice Roberts’ footnote
three is likely insufficient to tackle these externalities and social costs.153
Further, government funding routinely comes with strings attached. The
government constitutionally cannot “giv[e] significant aid to institutions that
practice racial or other invidious discrimination,”154 and funding programs
often require nondiscrimination in hiring and provision of services for
eligibility. In contrast, houses of worship are expressly permitted to
discriminate on religious grounds under federal law and various state public
accommodations statutes.155
Such neutral and generally applicable
nondiscrimination conditions to funding as applied to religious entities likely
do not violate the Free Exercise Clause156 or the unconstitutional conditions
151

152
153

154
155

156

See John W. Whitehead, Tax Exemption and Churches: A Historical and Constitutional Analysis ,
22 CUMB. L. REV. 521, 545–55 (1992) (detailing the history of tax exemptions for churches).
26 U.S.C. § 7611(a)(2), (b)(1)(A) (2012).
See Ira C. Lupu, Uncovering the Village of Kiryas Joel , 96 COLUM. L. REV. 104, 115 (1996)
(“Religious accommodations usually create externalities, in the sense that such accommodations
permit behavior which the polity would otherwise forbid; because the underlying prohibition
usually has social benefits, accommodations generate corresponding social costs.”).
Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 467 (1973).
See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1 (2012); Kelly Catherine Chapman, Gay Rights, the Bible, and Public
Accommodations: An Empirical Approach to Religious Exemptions for Holdout States , 100 GEO.
L.J. 1783, 1789 (2012) (noting at least twenty-two jurisdictions with public accommodations statutes
that prohibit sexual orientation discrimination, with most including at least “minimal” exemptions
for houses of worship).
See Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877 (1990) (describing the Free Exercise Clause and noting
that the government “may not compel affirmation of religious belief”).
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doctrine,157 but nonetheless clash with principles of noninterference. Of
course, these entities always have recourse to simply decline the funds. 158 But
the resulting conflict is clear where religious entities seek to exercise their
“right” to funding under Trinity Lutheran.159

C. Implications for State No-Aid Provisions
The Trinity Lutheran decision has sparked ample attention as to its
implications for government funding programs going forward. Some
commentators have expressed concern that the decision effectively creates a
new free exercise principle: “that the government is constitutionally required
to provide assistance to religious institutions.”160 Others have contrarily
argued that the decision is “long overdue,” and correctly extends the Free
Exercise Clause principle against discrimination based on religious status to
government benefits.161 Arguably most significantly, commentators on both
sides have noted that the decision calls into doubt the viability of state no-aid
provisions found in the majority of state constitutions.162
However, Trinity Lutheran’s implications for state Blaine Amendments
and similar constitutional provisions that prohibit government funding to
religious entities are likely not as far reaching as commentators have claimed
and, more importantly, should not be interpreted as such. State no-aid
provisions likely do not categorically violate the Free Exercise Clause for
three notable reasons.
First, state Blaines are largely consistent with the religious status versus

157
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160
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162

See, e.g., Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540, 544–46, 549, 551 (1983)
(holding that tax exemption condition prohibiting lobbying by certain nonprofits was not
unconstitutional condition because government is “not required . . . to subsidize lobbying”).
See Agency for Int’l Dev. v. All. for Open Soc’y Int’l, Inc., 570 U.S. 205, 214 (2013) (“As a general
matter, if a party objects to a condition on the receipt of federal funding, its recourse is to decline
the funds. This remains true when the objection is that a condition may affect the recipient’s
exercise of its First Amendment rights.”); Ibby Caputo & Jon Marcus, The Controversial Reason
Some Religious Colleges Forgo Federal Funding, ATLANTIC (July 7, 2016),
https://www.theatlantic.com/education/archive/2016/07/the-controversial-reason-some-religiouscolleges-forgo-federal-funding/490253/ (noting that religious colleges are refusing Title IV and IX
funding due to conditions prohibiting sexual orientation discrimination).
See Brief of Amicus Curiae Lambda Legal Defense & Education Fund, Inc. in Support of
Respondent at 18, Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012 (2017)
(No. 15–577), 2016 WL 3667051, at *18 (“[N]umerous courts have held that publicly funded
social service providers are not entitled to religious accommodations that would permit them to
deliver services in a sectarian or discriminatory manner, which would violate the Establishment
Clause.”); Richard W. Garnett & Jackson C. Blais, Religious Freedom and Recycled Tires: The
Meaning and Implications of Trinity Lutheran, 2017 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 105, 127–28.
Chemerinsky, supra note 4, at 358.
Garnett & Blais, supra note 159, at 121.
See, e.g., Erica Smith, Blaine Amendments and the Unconstitutionality of Excluding Religious
Options from School Choice Programs, 18 FEDERALIST SOC’Y REV. 48, 48, 58 (2017).
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religious use distinction proposed in Trinity Lutheran.163 Read to its broadest
conclusion, the Trinity Lutheran decision advances the proposition that any
government discrimination in generally available funding programs based on
religious status is the lynchpin of a free exercise violation. 164 However, the
majority in Trinity Lutheran explicitly recognized the continuing validity of
their decision in Locke, which implicitly upheld Washington’s constitutional
prohibition on the use of public funds for religious instruction as applied to
its state scholarship program.165 Specifically, the Trinity Lutheran majority
noted that the Locke petitioner “was not denied a scholarship because of
who he was; he was denied a scholarship because of what he proposed to
do—use the funds to prepare for the ministry.”166
State Blaine Amendments can similarly be construed as prohibiting the
religious use of taxpayer funds rather than excluding churches and religious
institutions from government funding programs “solely because of their
religious character.”167 The education funding context is particularly
illustrative. As noted in Section I.B.1 above, the failed national Blaine
Amendment was exclusively concerned with education funding.168 Today,
nearly forty states have Blaine Amendments in their constitutions, with the
vast majority of such amendments dealing primarily with education funding
to sectarian schools.169 Even absent a federal Establishment Clause violation,
prohibiting the use of public funds to pay for religious instruction at sectarian
schools is a legitimate government interest. 170 The Supreme Court has
repeatedly recognized the fundamental establishment concerns with religious
indoctrination in the education funding context. 171
While religious
163
164

165

166
167
168

169

170

171

Trinity Lutheran, 137 S. Ct. at 2023.
Id. at 2025 (“[T]he exclusion of Trinity Lutheran from a public benefit for which it is otherwise
qualified, solely because it is a church, is odious to our Constitution all the same, and cannot
stand.”).
See id. at 2022–23; Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 720–25 (2004) (holding that state scholarship
program’s prohibition on use of funds for theology degrees did not violate Free Exercise Clause).
Trinity Lutheran, 137 S. Ct. at 2023 (emphasis in original).
See id. at 2021 (emphasis added).
See 4 CONG. REC. 205 (1875); see also DeForrest, supra note 66, at 557 (“The second effect of
Blaine’s amendment would have been to prohibit state governments from supporting private
religious schools with funds from the public treasury.”).
See Green, supra note 69, at 327 (“Counts may vary, but thirty-eight states have express provisions
limiting or prohibiting public funding to religious schools (by whatever name) and/or prohibiting
control of the education fund by a religious entity.”); Goldenziel, supra note 64, at 69 (“While the
Federal Blaine Amendment was confined to restrictions of public funding of schools, twenty-one of
the thirty-nine no-funding provisions restrict funding to all religious institutions or societies, or any
funding that will be used for a religious purpose.”); see also Meir Katz, The State of Blaine: A
Closer Look at the Blaine Amendments and Their Modern Application , 12 ENGAGE 111, 111 &
n.1 (2011) (listing amendments).
See Locke, 540 U.S. at 722–25 (holding the state had a “substantial” interest in not funding
theological instruction, even though such funding would be permissible under federal
Establishment Clause).
See Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 687 (1971) (upholding direct grants to religiously affiliated
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instruction at sectarian schools may not be an “essentially religious endeavor”
to the same degree as the ministerial training sought by the petitioner in
Locke,172 the implications for funding religious indoctrination are
undoubtedly related.173
The status versus use distinction is relevant for this very reason. In the
context of a government benefit funded by taxpayer dollars, it does matter
“whether we describe that benefit, say, as closed to Lutherans (status) or
closed to people who do Lutheran things (use).”174 Providing funding to a
Lutheran to educate schoolchildren in religious doctrine, for example, is a
far cry from providing unemployment benefits to a Lutheran terminated for
refusing to work on the Sabbath.175 The relevant inquiry should include a
determination of whether funds from the public fisc will invariably be used
for inherently religious purposes, like instruction and indoctrination. The
Trinity Lutheran plurality implicitly recognized this distinction in their
controversial footnote 3; the free exercise violation largely existed because
playground resurfacing is not a religious activity. 176
Accordingly, state agencies may need to more closely evaluate the nature
of the aid provided under government programs before—pursuant to more
restrictive state constitutional provisions—adopting policies that categorically
exclude religious institutions. Funding programs that deny qualified religious
institutions clearly secular aid for clearly secular uses are prime for attack on
free exercise grounds post-Trinity Lutheran.
However, in practice, states by and large do not adopt such bright-line
rules concerning government funding to religious institutions under Blaine
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colleges because, inter alia, “religious indoctrination is not a substantial purpose or activity of these
church-related colleges and universities,” thus “there is less likelihood than in primary and
secondary schools that religion will permeate the area of secular education. This reduces the risk
that government aid will in fact serve to support religious activities.”); see also Mitchell v. Helms,
530 U.S. 793, 837–38 (2000) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (noting that “actual diversion of
government aid to religious indoctrination is in tension with our precedents” in cases of direct aid
to religious institutions); Bd. of Educ. of Cent. Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 245, 248
(1968) (noting that “this Court has long recognized that religious schools pursue two goals, religious
instruction and secular education,” but that secular textbooks and materials state provided to
religious schools were not “instrumental in the teaching of religion” (emphasis added)).
Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012, 2023 (2017) (quoting Locke
v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 721–22 (2004)).
Tilton, 403 U.S. at 685–86 (“The ‘affirmative if not dominant policy’ of the instruction in precollege church schools is ‘to assure future adherents to a particular faith by having control of their
total education at an early age.’” (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 671 (1970))).
Trinity Lutheran, 137 S. Ct. at 2026 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
See Hobbie v. Unemp’t Appeals Comm’n, 480 U.S. 136, 139–40 (1987); Sherbert v. Verner, 374
U.S. 398, 409–10 (1963).
Trinity Lutheran, 137 S. Ct. at 2023 (majority opinion) (“The claimant in Locke sought funding for
an ‘essentially religious endeavor . . . akin to a religious calling as well as an academic pursuit,’ and
opposition to such funding ‘to support church leaders’ lay at the historic core of the Religion
Clauses. Here nothing of the sort can be said about a program to use recycled tires to resurface
playgrounds.” (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted) (quoting Locke, 540 U.S. at 721–22)).
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Amendments or compelled support provisions, and often provide grants to
religious organizations for their secular activities.177 State interpretations of
their respective Blaine Amendments vary considerably178 and compelled
support provisions in particular generally do not bar religious organizations
from receiving neutral, generally applicable government benefits for secular
purposes.179 For instance, the Sixth Circuit found that a Michigan program
providing direct reimbursements to downtown Detroit property owners for
building façade refurbishment costs did not violate the state’s no-aid
provision even though it included churches in the program. 180 Finding that
the program did not violate the federal Establishment Clause, the court
applied Michigan courts’ interpretation of the no-aid provision as being
consistent with its federal counterpart.181
Moreover, even where courts have acknowledged that their state’s
constitutional no-aid provision draws a more stringent line than the federal
Establishment Clause, many have not found that the provisions bar
government funding to religious organizations for secular purposes.182 For
example, despite a no-aid provision that facially prohibits direct and indirect
funding of religious entities,183 Florida courts have allowed pervasively
religious institutions to provide secular social services programs. 184 Even the
Missouri Supreme Court, which has historically strictly interpreted its state’s
no-aid provision, noted the secular character of religiously affiliated Saint
Louis University’s proposed sports arena in holding that government funding
for the arena did not violate the state’s establishment clause.185
In addition, evidence that state legislatures enacted no-aid provisions due
to any hostility to religion is likely to be insufficient to demonstrate “animus”
violative of the Free Exercise Clause.186 “The [Locke] Court rejected the
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Katz, supra note 169, at 113 (“Many states have adopted programs that fund the secular charitable
operations of faith-based organizations.”).
See supra Section I.B.1.
Cauthen, supra note 63, at 2145.
Am. Atheists, Inc. v. City of Detroit Downtown Dev. Auth., 567 F.3d 278, 301 (6th Cir. 2009).
Id. at 301.
See, e.g., Council for Secular Humanism, Inc. v. McNeil, 44 So. 3d 112, 119 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2010) (noting that “Florida’s no-aid provision [is] ‘far stricter’ than the Establishment Clause, and
‘draw[s] a more stringent line than that drawn by the United States Constitution,’” but holding that
“Florida’s no-aid provision does not create a per se bar to the state providing funds to religious or
faith-based institutions to furnish necessary social services”).
FLA. CONST. art. I, § 3 (“No revenue of the state or any political subdivision or agency thereof shall
ever be taken from the public treasury directly or indirectly in aid of any church, sect, or religious
denomination or in aid of any sectarian institution.”).
Council for Secular Humanism, 44 So. 3d at 119.
Saint Louis Univ. v. Masonic Temple Ass’n of St. Louis, 220 S.W.3d 721, 728 (Mo. 2007) (“[Saint
Louis University’s] proposed sports arena is intended to redevelop a blighted area of [St. Louis]
and provide an avenue for secular student and community events; its purpose is not to advance
religion.”).
See Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 720–21, 724–25 (2004); cf. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye,
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notion . . . that lack of facial neutrality toward religion by a state program will
render it unconstitutional.”187 State compelled support provisions “can be
traced to the first state constitutions that often predate the First
Amendment”;188 thus, the requisite legislative history is likely to be
unavailable. With respect to state Blaine Amendments, Professor Lantta
notes that “[w]hile anti-Catholic animus was no doubt the impetus for the
federal amendment, ‘that sentiment is rarely evident in the legislative debates
surrounding the enactments’ of the various state amendments.”189
More importantly, “many if not most state constitutions have been reratified since the inclusion of the Blaine amendments, which probably
‘cleanses’ them of any improper motivation that may have initially existed.”190
Voters have specifically rejected attempts to remove language prohibiting
funding to sectarian institutions from state constitutions. For example, in a
2012 referendum, Florida voters overwhelmingly rejected the proposed
amendment 8 to their state constitution, which would have deleted existing
no-aid provision language and “add[ed] language prohibiting the denial of
government benefits and support on the basis of religious identity or
belief.”191 Amendment 8 did not receive the required sixty percent of the
vote in any county and garnered a majority in only six of Florida’s sixty-seven
counties.192
Finally, federalism concerns may ensure the viability of state Blaine
Amendments and compelled support clauses. Constitutional rights have
often been described with a “floor/ceiling metaphor”: the federal
Constitution provides the floor—the minimum level of protection—and state
constitutions provide a ceiling.193 Thus, states have latitude to enact
constitutional provisions that expand or contract substantive rights as long as
they stay within the minimum guidelines of the federal Constitution. The
Establishment Clause confers substantive rights, as evidenced by the unique
taxpayer standing to challenge suspect legislative enactments under it.194
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Accordingly, state Blaine Amendments can also be construed as expanding
Establishment Clause rights beyond the federal minimum. Such an
interpretation should be more than adequate where the nature of state
funding programs threatens religious indoctrination, as with school voucher
programs.
CONCLUSION
Despite the sweeping pronouncement of “discrimination” against
religious entities in the government funding context as “odious to our
Constitution,”195 Trinity Lutheran’s reasoning should remain limited to the
context in which it was decided. Broad interpretation of the majority’s
nondiscrimination principle severely narrows the “play in the joints” between
the Religion Clauses, where governments are free to exercise “benevolent
neutrality” towards religion.196
Further, expansive application of the decision’s principles may lead to
unintended and undesired results for religious and secular entities alike in
the receipt and application of government benefits and accommodations.
Accordingly, the relatively innocuous facts of the case should guide and
restrict future interpretations, lest the Free Exercise Clause be expanded to
render a swath of rational state constitutional amendments a virtual nullity.
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